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Abstract: This article contends that the Tsai administration will likely be positive for U.S.-
Taiwan relations. While the partnership may well require more work than was expended over the 
last eight years, the yield may be significant.  
 
fter eight years of relatively smooth but low-key relations with Taiwan during 
the administration of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) Ma Ying-jeou—from 2008-
2016—U.S. relations with Taiwan entered a new era with the landslide 
victory of Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in January 2016 
and her inauguration as the first female president of the Republic of China (ROC) 
four months later. 
 One important reason for Tsai’s successful campaign was her moderate 
policy on cross-Strait relations predicated on maintaining the status quo.  Due to the 
impact of cross-Strait relations on peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and 
U.S. obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the United States has a 
sustained interest in assessing how Taiwanese elections may affect cross-Strait 
relations and, therefore, U.S. interests.  During Tsai’s previous visit to the United 
States as a presidential candidate in 2011, she failed to assuage U.S. concerns.  Top 
U.S. officials disclosed their concerns, including in a lead article in the Financial Times, 
which hurt her in her race against an incumbent whose cross-Strait policy was better 
known.1 
 Tsai called on Washington a second time as a presidential candidate in 2015.  
This time, at least on the surface, official Washington was calmer.  Her major speech 
in June 2015 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was 
reasonably well received, despite the vagueness of her stated commitment to the 
 
1 “U.S. concerned about Taiwan candidate,” The Financial Times, Sept. 15, 2011, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f926fd14-df93-11e0-845a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz
4GFbARwCs.    
A 
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status quo.2  The campaign was going well for the DPP, whereas the KMT was mired 
in disarray following its fiasco in the 2014 “nine-in-one” local and municipal elections 
and the spring 2014 Sunflower Movement, which was a reaction against the Cross-
Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), in particular, and Ma’s cross-Strait policies, 
in general.  Washington refrained from words and actions similar to 2011.  However, 
many analysts and former officials still expressed their concerns that Tsai’s victory 
could rekindle tensions in cross-Strait relations.3  The reasons offered ranged from 
Tsai’s refusal to accept explicitly Beijing’s demand on the so-called 1992 Consensus, 
to Beijing’s possible escalation, and to concerns about U.S. entanglement by Taiwan.  
Will the second DPP presidency repeat the pattern of the first DPP presidency, 
during which President Chen Shui-bian’s words and deeds exacerbated Taiwan’s 
relations with China and the United States? 
 Based on available preliminary evidence, this article takes the position that 
U.S.-Taiwan relations under the Tsai administration overall will be largely positive.  It 
may require more skills to manage and it will take some time to adjust to this 
relationship.  The U.S.-Taiwan partnership may be higher maintenance than it was 
during the previous eight years. 
 Consider that although the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has maintained a 
consistent basic policy framework, impetuses for recalibration since 2000 have come 
mainly from Taiwan’s domestic politics and cross-Strait relations, rather than from 
changes in U.S. policy.  In terms of a triangular relationship involving three actors 
(Taiwan, China, and the U.S.) and three dyadic relationships (cross-Strait, U.S.-
Taiwan, and U.S.-China), changes in recent years have followed a sequential pattern: 
that is, overt changes, such as policies or actions taken by politicians or latent 
changes, such as Taiwan identity, originating in Taiwan (the first move) would cause 
changes in the direction and intensity of cross-Strait relations (the second move), 
which in turn would cause U.S. reactions to restore the status quo (the third move).  
The following section illustrates the contrasting sequential changes—Taiwanese 
domestic politics, cross-Strait relations, and U.S. reactions (corrective measures to 
restore the status quo)—of the three post-2000 Taiwanese administrations and the 
resultant external strategy pursued by each administration. 
 
The Chen Administration, 2000-2008  
 
In Taiwanese domestic politics, after Chen’s initial moderate policy of 
 
2 See transcript of her speech delivered at CSIS, “Taiwan Meeting the Challenges Crafting a 
Model of New Asian Value,” https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/event/—
150603_Tsai_Ing_wen_transcript.pdf.   
3 See, for example, Ted Galen Carpenter, “America Should Step Back from the Taiwan Time 
Bomb,” The National Interest, July 6, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
skeptics/america-should-step-back-the-taiwan-time-bomb-16864, and Michael Casey, “Time 
to Start Worrying about Taiwan,” The National Interest, June 12, 2016, 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/time-start-worrying-about-taiwan-16551.  Contrast with 
Bonnie S. Glaser, Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations as Tsai Ing-wen Assumes the Presidency in Taiwan, 
April 2016, https://www.csis.org/analysis/prospects-cross-strait-relations-tsai-ing-wen-
assumes-presidency-taiwan. 
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reassurance known as “Four Noes and One Without” (sibu yimeiyou),4 Chen began in 
2002 to push for, what could be viewed as, an aggressive Taiwanese nation-building 
project.5  Adopting a Taiwan narrative, the Chen administration actively promoted 
Taiwan identity, changed the textbooks and the names of state-owned enterprises in 
a conscious de-Sinification campaign.  Manifested in a high-profile but also futile 
external strategy, the Chen administration sought membership in the United Nations 
as a new nation under the name Taiwan and pursued membership in the World 
Health Organization (WHO).  Chen’s external strategy showed a clear preference for 
the United States and Japan and belied an anti-China overtone.   
  Cross-Strait relations during this period were tension-ridden.  Although 
Beijing could be faulted for not responding more favorably to Chen’s initial overtures 
in 2000-2002, and one wonders whether cross-Strait relations would have been 
different had Beijing been more flexible,6 after Chen’s apparent shift in July 2002 in 
response to China’s snatching Taiwan’s diplomatic ally, Nauru, cross-Strait relations 
became volatile and unstable.   
The principal U.S. policy concern at the time was that Chen’s pursuit of de 
jure independence could lead to China’s military retaliation and, consequently, 
entangle the United States in a war.  The U.S.’s reaction was mainly to put pressure 
on Taiwan.  The most dramatic example of this approach was when former U.S. 
President George W. Bush hosted former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in the White 
House in 2003. Bush called out Chen for seeking unilaterally to change the status 
quo.  The United States and China in essence “co-managed” Taiwan.  U.S.-Taiwan 
relations became difficult and high-maintenance.  One indication of this deteriorated 
relationship could be seen in the “transit diplomacy”—where the Taiwanese 
president is permitted to “transit” through the United States en route to another 
country and is allowed to engage in a set of carefully defined activities while on U.S. 
soil.  This had been used as an indicator of the state of U.S.-Taiwan relations in the 
absence of diplomatic relations.  Chen’s first transit was through New York City, 
where he received a human rights award.  Toward the end of the Chen 
 
4 Chen pledged in his May 20, 2000 Inauguration Speech that provided the People's Republic 
of China has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, his administration would not:  
1) declare Taiwanese independence; 2) change the national title from “the Republic of China” 
to  “the Republic of Taiwan”; 3) include the doctrine of special state-to-state relations in the 
Constitution of the Republic of China, or 4) promote a referendum on Taiwan independence, 
provided the PRC has no intention to use military force against Taiwan.  These four pledges 
are called the  “Four Noes.” In addition, the  “One Without” was that Chen's administration 
would not abolish the National Unification Council or the National Unification Guidelines.  
During his administration the National Unification Council met only once. On February 27, 
2006, Chen declared that the NUC “ceased to function.”  The full text of Chen’s speech can 
be found at http://fas.org/news/taiwan/2000/e-05-20-00-8.htm. 
5 Daniel Lynch, “Taiwan's self-conscious nation-building project,” Asian Survey, July/Aug. 
2004, pp. 513-533. 
6 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, “President Chen Shui-bian’s Mainland China Policy: Normalizing 
or Electioneering the Cross-Strait Impasse?” Cross-Strait and International Affairs Quarterly, July 
2004, pp. 103-151 
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administration, the U.S. State Department placed strict limits on Chen’s transit 
requests.  The options offered were so unpleasant—transit through Alaska and only 
for refueling—that Chen rejected the perceived reprimand and declined the transit 
visit.  U.S.-Taiwan relations went adrift, and Taiwan became the odd man out in the 
triangular U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship.7   
  
The Ma Administration: 2008-2016 
  
One of the Ma administration’s earliest and foremost policy priorities was to 
repair U.S.-Taiwan relations.  Another was to improve or even normalize cross-Strait 
relations.  In domestic Taiwanese politics, Ma halted Chen’s vigorous de-Sinification 
campaign and implemented certain measures that his critics viewed as re-Sinification.  
Adopting an ROC discourse, his administration stressed the ROC’s pivotal role in 
the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and the ROC’s sovereignty over disputed 
landforms in the East and South China Seas.  In his inauguration speech, Ma declared 
that his administration’s cross-Strait policy would follow the principle of “no 
unification, no independence and no use of force” and would be based on the so-
called 1992 Consensus.8 
 Cross-Strait relations eased considerably.  The two semi-official exchange 
bodies set up in the early 1990s—Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and 
China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS)—quickly 
resumed their dialogue, suspended since 1995, on the basis of the 1992 Consensus.9  
By the time Ma left office, the two sides—under the aegis of SEF and ARATS—had 
signed 23 agreements.  The 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA) was the seminal agreement.10    
As the “low-hanging fruit” in economic cooperation was exhausted, 
discussions moved from the technical, and relatively uncontroversial, to the political.  
Issues such as military confidence-building measures, Taiwan’s international space, 
and a cross-Strait peace agreement implicated Taiwan’s sovereignty and security.  
Reaching agreements became harder and Taiwan’s domestic political support waned.  
 
7 Dan Blumenthal and Randall Schriver, Strengthening Freedom in Asia: A Twenty-First-Century 
Agenda for The U.S.-Taiwan Partnership (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2008), 
http://www.us-taiwan.org/reports/2008_february22_taiwan_policy_working_group
_report.pdf.    
8 For a full text of his inauguration speech “Taiwan’s Renaissance” on May 20, 2008, http://
taiwaninfo.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=43975&CtNode=458&htx_TRCategory=&mp=4.   
9 Jiuer gong shi (the 1992 Consensus) was a term of art coined by Dr. Chi Su in April 2000 to 
summarize or epitomize the political understanding reached between SEF and ARATS with 
official blessing from both sides.  It is essentially an agreement to disagree.  Taiwan equates 
that with yizhong gebiao (One China, but each side has its own interpretation).  China equates 
that with gebiao yizhong (each side reaffirms the One China principle).  Over the years, Beijing 
placed increasing emphasis on the yizhong and almost never publicly endorsed gebiao.  See Chi 
Su, Weixian bianyuan: cong liangguolun dao yibian yiguo (On the Principle of Perils: From the Two-
State Theory to One Country on Either Side)(Taipei: Bookzone, 2003), pp. 4-75. 
10 For a list of these agreements, see http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=67145&CtNode
=5710&mp=1.   
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The Sunflower Movement of 2014 coalesced increasing public weariness toward Ma’s 
mainland policy in his second term.  At any rate, Beijing was content to engage the 
Ma administration under the pretext of “peaceful development” and opted to take a 
less aggressive approach toward Taiwan’s international space, although critics 
contended that Beijing did not cede on its fundamental position in Taiwan’s status, 
all those “concessions” were minor or reversible, and Taiwan might have marginally 
expanded its international space but validated Beijing’s veto power.  Taipei also 
adopted a less confrontational approach toward expanding its international space: 
rather than seeking membership in symbolic political organizations, such as the UN 
General Assembly, Taipei quietly but noticeably shifted its quest to “meaningful 
participation” (usually meaning observership) in functional and specialized agencies, 
such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Interpol, 
and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Taiwan began 
participating in the World Health Assembly (WHA), the plenary body of the WHO, 
as an observer in 2009 under the name “Chinese Taipei.”  In 2013, Taiwan was 
invited to the 38th International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly as a special 
guest—also under the name “Chinese Taipei”—by the ICAO Council President.11  
Beijing seemed to have also tacitly honored Ma’s call for a “diplomatic truce.”  The 
number of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies remained at 23 until November 2013, when 
Gambia unilaterally severed formal ties with Taipei.  China did not re-establish 
diplomatic ties with the West African nation until March 2016, just two months 
before Tsai’s inauguration, in a move seen as a warning to Tsai. 
 Ma’s external strategy can be summarized as qinmei, hezhong, youri (pro-U.S., 
peace with China, and friendship with Japan).  The ordering of these three most 
important bilateral relationships for Taiwan is not accidental.  It showed that Taipei 
sought to improve its relations with both Washington and Beijing to maximize 
Taiwan’s interests.  Comparing Ma to Chen, Ma’s detractors criticized him for in 
practice, pursuing a China-first strategy. 
 In terms of U.S.-Taiwan relations, Ma promised “zero surprise” interactions 
and worked to rebuild trust with the United States.  U.S.-Taiwan relations notably 
improved, albeit in a deliberately low-key manner.  Evidence includes the U.S.’s 
granting Taiwan residents the Visa Waiver Program (VWP); the resumption of the 
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) talks after a seven-year hiatus 
following the outbreak of mad cow disease in the United States in 2006; new rounds 
of arms sales; and less visible forms of defense cooperation.12  U.S. officials on more 
than one occasion publicly praised the improvement in cross-Strait relations, as this 
 
11 Joseph Yeh, “Taiwan to attend ICAO Assembly as  ‘invited guest,’” The China Post, Sept.14, 
2013, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/intl-community/2013/09/14/388889/Taiwan-
to.htm.  There is considerable doubt whether Taiwan would receive another invitation in 2016 
for the triennial ICAO assembly given Beijing’s insistence on the 1992 Consensus and Tsai’s 
hitherto refusal to accept it. 
12 See the congressional testimony of former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, “Why Taiwan Matters, Part II,” Oct. 4, 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/10/174980.htm.  
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reduced tensions in the region, encouraged dialogue, and alleviated U.S. policy 
concerns.13  U.S.-Taiwan relations were characterized by relatively modest 
expectations and low maintenance.  It was unclear whether the two governments 
held a serious strategic dialogue about U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific region and 
Taiwan’s role in it.  One piece of evidence was the curious (or studied) U.S. official 
silence on Taiwan in any of the three definitive documents defining the U.S. pivot to 
Asia (also known as the “rebalance” policy).14 
 With rapidly improving cross-Strait relations, U.S. officials and think tank 
analysts began to voice a different kind of concern: whether cross-Strait 
rapprochement under Ma would proceed at such a speed and toward such a direction 
that it might adversely affect U.S. interests or at least cause the United States to be 
less certain about its roles in cross-Strait relations.  Periodically scholars or former 
officials have advocated the U.S.’s “abandoning” Taiwan, but so far these voices have 
not become mainstream opinions. Over the course of Ma’s term, concern about the 
opposite problem grew—the question Nancy Tucker articulated in 2002, “If Taiwan 
chooses unification, should the United States care?”15   
 
The Tsai Administration, 2016- 
  
With the ascension of Tsai, U.S. officials no longer worried that Taiwan will 
be absorbed into China’s orbit, at least voluntarily, as it adopted a more cautious 
approach toward cross-Strait relations.  The new question was whether to adjust U.S. 
policy yet again to deal with the anticipated cooling-off (if not worsening) cross-Strait 
relations. 
 The second DPP administration is unlikely to commit the same mistakes that 
the first DPP administration made.  All three actors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan 
strategic triangle seem content with the status quo—no one side is fully satisfied, but 
all can live with it.  There is no discernible urgency for drastic change and no 
 
13 See State Department official David Shear’s keynote speech at the conference on “Cross-
Strait Relations in a New Era of Negotiation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
July 7, 2010, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/07/144363.htm and 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/07/07/cross-strait-relations-in-new-era-of-
negotiation/1z7k. 
14 The three definitive statements about the pivot policy are: Hillary Clinton, “America's 
Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, Oct. 11, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century; “Remarks by President Obama to the 
Australian Parliament,” Nov. 17, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament; Remarks By Tom 
Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President: "The United States and the Asia-Pacific 
in 2013," at the Asia Society, March 3, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-president-united-states-
a.  For an analysis of this official silence, see Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, “The U.S. Asia 
Rebalancing and the Taiwan Strait Rapprochement,” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, Summer 
2015, pp. 361-379.   
15 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?” 
The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 3 (2002), pp. 15-28. 
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rationale for increased tension.  The unknown is Beijing’s flexibility toward the Tsai 
administration.   
 Judging from Tsai’s campaign and inaugural speech, her main priorities will 
be domestic issues.  Several tough challenges, such as revitalizing Taiwan’s economy, 
pension reform, improving the social safety net, judicial reform, and transitional 
justice, form a daunting agenda.  She needs much help on these issues but may not 
get very much. 
 In cross-Strait policy, she struck a conciliatory tone toward Beijing by 
pledging to maintain the status quo and refrain from provocative acts.  But she also 
made it clear that she would not accept Beijing’s demand that she accept the 1992 
Consensus and the One China principle.  Her inaugural address acknowledged the 
“historical fact” that in 1992 SEF and ARATS “arrived at various joint 
acknowledgements and understandings […] in a spirit of mutual understanding and 
[…] seeking common ground while setting aside differences.”  She also indicated her 
“respect” for the “historical fact” that “over twenty years of interactions and 
negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated the status quo and 
outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain; and it is based on 
such existing realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful 
development of the cross-Strait relationship must be continuously promoted.”  She 
pledged to conduct cross-Strait relations “in accordance with the ROC Constitution, 
the Act Governing Relations between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland 
Area, and other relevant legislation.”  She further explained the elements constituting 
what she called “existing political foundations”: (1) the historical fact of the 1992 
talks between the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (SEF and 
ARATS), when there was joint acknowledgement of setting aside differences to seek 
common ground; (2) the existing ROC constitutional order; (3) the outcomes of over 
twenty years of negotiations and interactions across the Strait; and (4) the democratic 
principle and prevalent will of the people of Taiwan.16 
 China’s initial reaction was relatively measured but dissatisfied.  Terming 
Tsai’s speech, an “unfinished test answer,” and continuously pressing Tsai to answer 
the key question on the nature of the relations between the two sides, China 
nonetheless could discern certain potentially encouraging common ground and has 
wisely not set a deadline for compliance.  Beijing essentially decided to watch Tsai’s 
behavior and listen to her words for a while.  Thus, there should be no immediate 
crisis in the Taiwan Strait.  However, how long this “cold peace” can last remains to 
be seen.  Should Taiwan or China decide to take unilateral or provocative acts that 
are driven by domestic causes or political calculations, the United States could find 
itself faced with a deteriorating cross-Strait relationship and again be forced to act.   
 Although the Tsai administration will not fundamentally disagree with the 
Ma administration on the importance of the United States, China, and Japan to 
Taiwan, it surely will elevate the importance of the United States and Japan over 
 
16 The full text of Tsai’s inaugural address is available at http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/
201605200008.aspx.   
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China.  This can be seen in the fact that Tsai dealt with cross-Strait relations in the 
section on regional peace in her inaugural address—only one-half of one of the five 
main topics. 
Since Tsai has not behaved provocatively, the United States should not 
proactively press her to accede to China’s demands as a way to keep the peace.  A 
better approach for preventive diplomacy in this case would include ongoing 
dialogues with China and Taiwan, expecting the two sides to maintain peace and 
stability, encouraging the Chinese to show more flexibility toward Tsai, and 
counseling Taiwan on the virtue of caution in cross-Strait affairs.  To return to the 
model laid out earlier, the United States, as the actor making the third move, can and 
should shape the environment (including incentives) in such a way that it will 
encourage the first mover (Taiwan) and the second mover (China) to make wise 
choices.  In theory, the United States can change its role and become the first mover, 
which would impact U.S.-China relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations and affect how 
these two other actors act.  For example, the United States might reassess Taiwan’s 
roles and contributions in the broader U.S. security strategy or in light of U.S.-China 
relations.  With the U.S. presidential election looming, this debate is far from over. 
 Although this article takes a cautiously optimistic view of U.S.-Taiwan 
relations in the early months of the Tsai administration and does not share the 
immediate worries of some analysts, U.S.-Taiwan relations may experience a period 
of adjustment and some uncertainty, depending on the outcomes of the U.S. 
elections and the speed of confirmation of key administration officials responsible 
for Asian policy.  Specifically, several priorities and outstanding issues will require 
skillful management in Taipei and in Washington. 
 
High-Level Strategic Dialogue  
 
U.S. officials should quietly, quickly, and substantively—not just 
symbolically—engage their counterparts in the Tsai administration.  Such interactions 
should serve the purpose of “renegotiating” an (implicit) security pact to guide more 
specific policies.  They should clarify each side’s strategic intentions, provide political 
reassurance, and establish close working relationships.  As the United States is 
Taiwan’s ultimate security guarantor (if the U.S. president and congress adhere to the 
TRA or otherwise decide to defend Taiwan) even though the two countries are not 
formally allies, the dilemma inherent in alliance management still exists: the patron 
state fears entrapment and the client state fears abandonment.17  This poses familiar 
but significant challenges in managing the relationship. 
In light of China’s growing assertiveness in regional affairs (such as South 
and East China Seas) under Xi Jinping and the increasingly frayed and potentially 
confrontational U.S.-China relationship, U.S. and Taiwanese security advisors should 
engage in a substantive conversation on how each side may need support from, or 
offer support to, the other side.   
 
17 See Glenn Snyder’s classic discussion of the entrapment vs. abandonment dilemma in 
alliance politics, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics, July 1984, pp. 461-
495. 
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Given the structural constraints imposed by the unofficial nature of U.S.-
Taiwan relations, high-level security dialogues have occurred sparingly and only after 
the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.  Given the Chinese challenge to U.S. leadership in the 
region and the concerns about a Taiwanese administration under DPP rule that 
might upset the apple cart, such dialogues should increase in frequency, scope, and 
depth.   
During Tsai’s first transit as ROC president through the United States in 
June, several members of her national security team joined her entourage.  It was 
useful for U.S. officials to meet with these new people.  But that is only the first step.  
The two sides met in late June in Washington, for the Defense Review Talks.  The 
most important security dialogue—the so-called Monterey Talks—is usually held in 
August.  But as of mid-August 2016, no announcement has been made about this 
year’s talk and there is fear that it might not occur this year due to the changeover of 
the head of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT).  It would be wise for the United 
States to include Taiwan in those talks.18 
 
Taiwan’s Defense Needs 
 
The TRA and the Six Assurances19 clearly mandate that the United States 
provide Taiwan with defensive articles and services based on Taiwan’s defensive 
needs, and not in consultation with China.  However, arms sales to Taiwan have 
become very symbolic and politicized.  U.S. concerns about China’s possible 
reactions, bureaucratic infighting within U.S. military, partisan politics in Taiwan, and 
the penchant to use U.S. arms sales as proxy indicators for the U.S.’s security 
commitment to Taiwan have combined to create a convoluted process.  Certain 
items have been offered, then long delayed (e.g., the diesel-powered submarines that 
former President George W. Bush promised in 2001).  Some have become the focus 
of debates about whether they serve Taiwan’s defense needs well (e.g., some writers 
argue that rather than investing in assets aimed at preserving Taiwan’s air or sea 
superiority, Taiwan should invest in passive defense). Others fell short of what 
Taiwan requested (e.g., F-16AB retrofits rather than F-16CD or fifth-generation 
fighters).  When new items have been delivered, they often have come after the PRC 
has acquired similar capabilities.  U.S. officials complain that Taiwan has fallen short 
of its own goal of devoting three percent of GDP to defense.  In other words, even 
on an issue where both sides should see eye to eye, there is occasional discord.   
Probably out of frustration with this pattern and in search of new economic 
 
18 “U.S.-Taiwan ‘Monterey Talks’ to Begin Mid-August.  Location Kept Secret” (in Chinese), 
The United Daily News, Aug. 4, 2016, http://udn.com/news/story/6656/1873009; “U.S.-
Taiwan Defense Review Talks, High-Ranking Security Officials Participate the Conference 
for the First Time” (in Chinese), The United Daily News, June 17, 2016, http://udn.com/news/
story/5/1767725.  
19 In May 2016, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.Con.Res.88 - Reaffirming the 
Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of United States-Taiwan 
relations, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/88.  
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vitality, Tsai in her inaugural address advocated a domestic defense industry (and 
singled out submarines) as one of five industries to be promoted by her 
administration.  If the United States cannot sell diesel submarines to Taiwan as 
promised, it should help secure the design and facilitate technology transfer for the 
few key parts that Taiwan is still not able to produce on its own.20  
The annual reports on PLA military power, published by the U.S. 
Department of Defense, point out that the cross-Strait military balance continues to 
shift to China’s advantage.  As China continues to increase its defense spending at 
double-digit rates, while Taiwan seeks to cope with a shrinking population and the 
rising expenses of its welfare system (especially if Tsai’s social safety net reform is 
implemented, which would drive up the cost even further), Taiwan’s security 
challenges become increasingly complex.  This requires the United States and Taiwan 
to work together even more closely.    
Coping with these issues will require a depoliticized and professional 
problem-solving approach to meet Taiwan’s genuine defense needs.  A robust 
Taiwan capable of defending itself, or at least not becoming a weak link in the 
regional security architecture, can better preserve political options for its democratic 
citizenry and avoid complicating the U.S. security posture in the region. 
 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
  
The Trans-Pacific Partnership has been called the economic pillar of the 
U.S.’s pivot, or rebalance, to Asia.  The Obama Administration argues that this 
“twenty-first century trade agreement” is critical to U.S. leadership in the Asia-
Pacific, where competing trade agreements have been proliferating (and often led by 
China).21  After seven years of negotiation, the twelve trading partners reached an 
agreement in March 2015.  But the U.S. Congress, which had earlier given the 
Obama Administration so-called fast track authority under the Trade Promotion Act, 
has not taken up the vote on the final text (which, under the terms of fast-track 
authority, Congress is supposed to submit to a simple up or down vote).  Mired in a 
presidential election year when neither major party’s candidate supports the TPP, the 
TPP appears at best to face an uncertain fate. 
 Assessing the criteria for TPP membership from the usual economic and 
non-economic angles, Taiwan can make a good case as a candidate for admission in 
the TPP’s second round.  Both the KMT (Ma) and DPP (Tsai) governments have 
expressed interest in Taiwan joining the TPP (and have argued that it is imperative 
that Taiwan do so), so there appears to be bipartisan support in Taiwan for the TPP.  
 
20 “Military to continue with indigenous submarine project: defense ministry,” China Post, May 
22, 2016, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-
news/2016/05/22/466917/Military-to.htm.  To be sure, the United States has not produced 
diesel submarines in over 50 years and the U.S. Navy’s pro-nuclear lobby was firmly opposed 
to producing any non-nuclear submarines.  So the most plausible way to fulfill President 
Bush’s offer would have been to promise technical help and/or work behind the scenes to 
pressure allies such as Germany to have its shipyards assist.   
21 See United States Trade Representative’s Office, https://ustr.gov/tpp/.   
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However, there is also powerful domestic resistance.  Certain government agencies 
are open to making concessions or undertaking reforms only as quid-pro-quos with 
other TPP members as the price of admission.  They resist making more sweeping 
reforms a priori that would make Taiwan a more attractive candidate (and benefit 
Taiwan in other ways as well). 
 The Taiwanese government has publicly expressed its interest, and the U.S. 
government has publicly welcomed Taiwan’s interest, but so far the United States has 
not taken any concrete measures to push for Taiwan’s entry, arguing that Taiwan 
needs the support of all twelve members to join.  The United States should and can 
be more proactive, because supporting Taiwan is mutually beneficial.  If Taiwan were 
a member of TPP, it would be the sixth largest economy in the pact.  It is also the 
U.S.’s ninth largest trading partner.  The economic benefits from a trade deal with 
Taiwan are, thus, greater than those that flow from most existing U.S. trade 
agreements.22       
 Currently the main channel for trade talks between the United States and 
Taiwan is TIFA.  Since the resumption of TIFA negotiations in March 2013, the 
main source of impasse has been the pork issue.  Taiwan bans the import of U.S. 
pork containing ractopamine, citing human health concerns.  But U.S. officials argue 
that those concerns are not scientifically based and, therefore, the ban constitutes a 
trade barrier.  Some U.S. writers have described the resolution of the pork issue as 
Taiwan’s “down payment” for TPP entry. There are early signs that the Tsai 
administration is seeking ways to lift the ban on U.S. pork and let the market decide 
whether U.S. pork sells in Taiwan.  But this move quickly faced considerable 
domestic opposition.   
TPP faces tremendous domestic opposition in the United States as well.  It 
has proved politically unpopular in an election year.  Donald Trump promised to kill 
the TPP if he is elected president.  Hillary Clinton, who was Secretary of State in the 
first Obama Administration and played a key role in the pivot policy, has also 
changed her position and now says that she opposes the TPP.  The only near-term 
chance for the TPP to become a reality is for President Obama to convince Congress 
to act on the agreement before his term ends in January 2017.  But this is extremely 
unlikely.  
 
Taiwan’s International Participation 
  
The United States can be more proactive in supporting Taiwan’s 
participation in the international community.  Opinion polls in Taiwan consistently 
have shown that greater international participation enjoys wide popular support, and 
that restrictions placed on Taiwan’s international participation (exclusion, unfair 
 
22 The United States has free trade agreements in force with 20 countries. These are: Australia, 
Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, and 
Singapore. See https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements.   
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treatment, imposing demeaning monikers such as “Chinese Taipei”) are a constant 
source of frustration and make Taiwanese more unfavorably disposed toward China.   
The people of Taiwan feel they have worked hard to earn their economic and 
political accomplishments and the principle of universality means that Taiwan should 
be entitled to participate in the international community with a suitable stature just 
like other nations.   
The main obstacles to Taiwan’s participation come from China’s 
obstruction.  China has worked vigorously to restrict Taiwan’s international space.  In 
recent years, even though it has begun to acknowledge the importance of this issue to 
the Taiwanese people, China has maintained that Taiwan should negotiate its 
international space with Beijing and has shown only limited flexibility.  Taiwan’s 
occasional appearances at the WHA and the ICAO appear to have resulted from 
Beijing’s decision to offer a “reward” to the Ma administration for its acceptance of 
the 1992 Consensus and its adoption of a less confrontational approach to Taiwan’s 
international participation. The “concessions” China has made are all reversible.  In 
May 2016, just before Tsai’s inauguration, Taiwan received the WHA Director-
General’s invitation.  It came much later than in previous years, and the invitation 
invoked the 1971 UNGA Resolution 2758, which expelled ROC from the UN and 
replaced it with the PRC.  Taiwan’s Minister of Health and Welfare went to the 
WHA and privately delivered a letter to the Director-General making clear Taiwan 
does not accept Resolution 2758 as a condition for the invitation. 
The Ma administration touted the WHA and ICAO appearances as 
breakthroughs made possible only as a result of improved cross-Strait relations 
achieved under the framework of the 1992 Consensus.  DPP supporters argued those 
breakthroughs were insignificant and perhaps made Taiwan even more dependent on 
China, but they could suggest no better alternatives.  Early signs are that the Tsai 
government will inherit and continue the models of participation in the WHA and 
the ICAO established during the Ma administration.  Although Beijing can certainly 
take away such opportunities, such a move, although confirming Beijing’s formidable 
ability to limit Taiwan’s international space, would only further alienate the 
Taiwanese people. 
 The United States should also work more diligently to remove self-imposed 
restrictions on supporting Taiwan’s enjoyment of international space.  For example, 
Article 4 of the 1979 TRA says, “Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for 
supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any 
international financial institution or any other international organization.”23  But the 
reality is that Taiwan has been excluded since then from all UN-affiliated 
organizations and specialized agencies.  In 1998, former President Bill Clinton, while 
in Shanghai, uttered the so-called Three Noes, which included “And we don't believe 
that Taiwan should be a member of any organization for which statehood is a 
requirement.”24  This proscription severely limited U.S. capacity to assist Taiwan’s 
attempts to join international organizations.  The State Department currently makes 
 
23 For the text of TRA, see http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html.   
24 John M. Broder, “Clinton Says U.S. Does Not Support Independence for Taiwan,” The New 
York Times, July 1, 1998, p. A12. 
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this distinction: the U.S. supports Taiwan’s membership in those organizations where 
statehood is not required, but the U.S. supports only Taiwan’s meaningful 
participation or to have its voice heard in those organizations where statehood is 
required.  Taiwan’s alleged lack of statehood is a construct rather than an inherent 
deficiency. U.S. policy choices have limited the U.S.’s capacity to help Taiwan gain 
access and make the positive contributions Taiwan can make.  Judging from all those 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) where Taiwan and China are both members, 
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), and Asian Development Bank (ADB), strong U.S. support is crucial and can 
be effective in achieving or maintaining Taiwan’s membership.  Among the most 
important organizations that set the rules for global governance are IGOs.  If the 
U.S. supports only Taiwan’s memberships in NGOs and Taiwan’s “meaningful 
participation” in IGOs, Taiwan’s international space will remain quite limited and 
Taiwan can hardly participate in setting the rules.  If the Tsai administration asks the 
United States for stronger support for Taiwan’s international participation, including 
in those IGOs, treaties, or trade agreements crucial to Taiwan’s well-being, the U.S. 
should be more supportive.  Past experience (APEC, WTO, WHA, ICAO, etc.) 
shows that U.S. leadership is critical.  Greater U.S. support for Taiwan’s international 
space will contribute to a more internationally engaged Taiwan and have a positive 
effect on U.S.-Taiwan partnership (see below). 
 
U.S.-Taiwan Bilateral, Regional, and Global Cooperation  
 
Most of the conventional discussions of U.S.-Taiwan relations portray the 
relationship as one of asymmetric dependence: Taiwan needs the U.S. (for security, 
economic, and diplomatic reasons) more than the United States needs Taiwan.  Such 
assessments fail to mention the positive roles Taiwan can play that align with U.S. 
agendas on regional and global issues.  Seeing U.S.-Taiwan relations as a one-sided 
relationship also limits the potential of this relationship, because Taiwan will always 
be seen as weak, dependent, unpredictable, a liability, or a potential problem. 
After the Chen years, the United States and Taiwan began to explore a 
positive agenda.  One promising initiative is called the Global Cooperation Training 
Framework (GCTF). Under this program, the United States and Taiwan conduct 
training programs for experts from throughout the region to assist them with 
building their own capacities to tackle issues where Taiwan has proven expertise and 
accomplishments, including women’s rights, humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief, democratization, global health, and energy security.  In State Department 
official Kurt Tong’s words, the GCTF serves as “a vehicle for the United States to 
help showcase Taiwan’s strengths and expertise by addressing global and regional 
concerns.”25 
 
25 “Taiwan's International Role and the GCTF,” remarks by Kurt Tong, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, State Department, at the Sigur 
Center for Asian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington 
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Exploring Taiwan’s potential positive contributions to regional and global 
affairs and helping to play up Taiwan’s strengths with U.S. partnership, the GCTF 
represents a conceptual change with great potential, and it is well-framed to avoid 
PRC obstruction.  But it is only one initiative.  Can the United States and Taiwan 
enlarge the scope of their positive agenda?  How will the Tsai administration seek to 
play a larger regional/global role through the GCTF or other vehicles?  How much 
more is the United States prepared to engage and showcase Taiwan? 
 
Asian Maritime Territorial Issues 
 
 On July 12, 2016, an international arbitration panel of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (PCA) in the Hague, in a comprehensive ruling, held that the PRC’s 
so-called Nine-Dash line had no standing in international law.  The tribunal also 
ruled that all of the land features in the South China Sea, including Taiwan-controlled 
Taiping Island (Itu Aba), are not entitled to a 200-mile exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ).26  The rulings put Taiwan in a bind.  The Ma administration had sought to 
demonstrate that Taiping Island, which had been controlled by Taiwan since 1947, is 
an island entitled to an EEZ under Article 121 of the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) by traveling there and bringing back fresh water.27  The Ma 
administration’s position on the PRC’s more expansive Nine-Dash line, based on 
historical rights, was more ambiguous.  On the one hand, the PRC’s Nine-Dash line 
originated from an ROC map of 1947 featuring eleven-dash lines.  As the ROC’s 
president, Ma could not publicly renounce rights or sovereignty.  On the other hand, 
Ma also realized that the PRC’s position had no legal standing under UNCLOS, 
given his own training in international maritime law.  Taking a stance too close to the 
PRC’s on the South China Seas would, he surely realized, be legally untenable and 
politically unwise.   
 Tsai, on the other hand, might have been more sanguine about the ruling on 
Taiping Island, and her reaction toward the ruling on the Nine-Dash line was as mute 
as possible.  She was relatively quiet, notwithstanding her promise to safeguard the 
ROC constitution, which contains stipulations about “guyou jiangyu” (historical or 
existing territories).   
In other words, from the perspective of its place in the U.S.-China-Taiwan 
                                                                                                                           
University, Washington, DC, March 2, 2016, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2016/
253915.htm.   
26 Robert D. Williams, “Tribunal Issues Landmark Ruling in South China Sea Arbitration,” 
Lawfare, July 12, 2016, https://www.lawfareblog.com/tribunal-issues-landmark-ruling-south-
china-sea-arbitration; Jacques deLisle, “The South China Sea Arbitration Decision: China 
Fought the Law, and the Law Won…Or Did It?” FPRI E-Note, July 12, 2016, http://
www.fpri.org/article/2016/07/south-china-sea-arbitration-decision-china-fought-law-law-
won/.   
27 Yann-huei Song, “Taiping Island: An Island or a Rock under UNCLOS,” Asia Maritime 
Transparency Initiative, May 7, 2015, https://amti.csis.org/taiping-island-an-island-or-a-rock-
under-unclos/; Jacques deLisle, “Why Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s Day-Trip to Taiping 
Island was Such a Big Deal,” FPRI E-Note, February 11, 2016, http://www.fpri.org/article/
2016/02/why-taiwan-president-ma-ying-jeous-day-trip-taiping-island-was-such-big-deal/.   
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triangle,  Taiwan appeared to be a loser in the PCA arbitration: it was not invited, or 
allowed, to participate in the process; its argument on Taiping Island was rejected; its 
Eleven-Dash line was implicitly rejected; and it was on the “wrong side” in terms of 
international politics—at odds with the United States and its ally and the victor in the 
case, the Philippines.  But, given Tsai’s even greater caution than Ma’s about being 
seen as collaborating with the PRC, Tsai is unlikely to let the ruling poison U.S.-
Taiwan relations.  Tsai’s ambivalence is belied by her refusal to visit Taiping herself, 
her government’s discouragement of any private individuals (fishermen, politicians) 
visiting there, and her near silence on the Nine-Dash line issue.  While KMT 
supporters criticized her reactions, it is doubtful most Taiwanese feel about these 
faraway islands the same way as Tsai’s nationalist critics. 
In important ways, the status quo continues.  Taiwan continues its presence 
on Taiping.  Other claimants continue their activities in the areas they control.  
China’s activities have been ruled illegal.  Since, according to the arbitration panel, no 
land feature qualifies as an island with an EEZ, much of the South China Sea remains 
high seas, open to all.  This conclusion is favored by the United States because it 
retains maximum rights to freedom of navigation, which is an important source of its 
power and credibility in the region.  
 
 This article ends with a cautionary note.  The next five months (between 
August 2016 and January 2017, when the new U.S. president is inaugurated) could be 
uncertain times for U.S.-Taiwan relations.  If the Chinese conclude that the outgoing 
(or lame duck) Obama Administration is unlikely to respond resolutely, they may 
accelerate land reclamation or declare an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in 
the South China Sea.  By the same token, if they grow impatient with Tsai Ing-wen 
and decide to turn up pressure against Taiwan to accept the 1992 Consensus as 
Beijing defines it, will they also in turn test the United States?  So far, the Chinese 
have “punished” Taiwan by removing some of what the Chinese perceive to be their 
unilateral concessions to Taiwan, such as threatening to reduce the number of 
tourists (especially tour groups organized by provincial or local governments and 
state-owned firms),28 eliminating customs duty concession and preferred purchase 
schemes, suspending contacts between SEF and ARATS, and halting interactions 
between Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and China’s Taiwan Affairs 
Office (TAO).  Will this “re-normalization” lead to a cooler relationship across the 
Taiwan Strait?  Will the relationship become so cold that serious mistrust develops?  
The recent errant missile released from a Taiwanese frigate in the direction of China’s 
Xiamen, striking a Taiwanese fisherman, laid bare the very limited channels of 
communication that remain between the two sides, as China’s TAO head Zhang 
 
28 ROC government statistics discern a trend since the beginning of 2016 mainland tourists to 
Taiwan have declined in absolute numbers and relative importance, notwithstanding monthly 
variations.  For February 2016, 405,307 visitors to Taiwan (or 44% of the total) came from 
China, down 0.29% year-to-year.  For June 2016 (the latest data available and one month after 
Tsai’s inauguration), 271,478 visitors to Taiwan (or 33.2% of the total) came from China, 
down 11.9% year-to-year.  See http://admin.taiwan.net.tw/statistics/release_en.aspx?no=13  
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Zhijun openly complained that Taiwan would rather brief the United States but did 
not offer a satisfactory explanation to China.29  
 Another looming uncertainty is the outcome of the U.S. presidential election.  
Both the Democratic and Republican parties held their national conventions in July.  
When it comes to Taiwan, both parties’ platforms contain fairly standard language.30  
Conventional wisdom may hold that Taiwan might fare better under a Hillary Clinton 
administration, given her previous roles in U.S. foreign policy in general and the 
pivot to Asia in particular, her perceived personal antipathy toward China, her prior 
visit to Taiwan, and her likely seasoned foreign policy advisors such as Kurt 
Campbell.   
It is difficult to imagine how Taiwan would fare under a Donald Trump 
administration.  Despite the slightly more pro-Taiwan language in the Republican 
Party platform (especially its endorsement of the so-called Six Assurances), Trump 
has yet to articulate a coherent foreign policy agenda other than isolationism.  
Traditional allies such as NATO states, Japan, and South Korea have much to worry 
about if Trump wins.  Although he has accused China of manipulating its currency 
and stealing U.S. jobs, it is doubtful that he will either see China as a strategic 
competitor or Taiwan as a strategic asset. In his foreign policy views, Trump is not 
ardently anti-communist or pro-democracy—two ideological views that have 
underpinned U.S. support for Taiwan in the past.  In his fervor to “wean” U.S. allies 
and his “business approach” to foreign affairs, he may even strike a deal with China 
over Taiwan or sacrifice Taiwan to get along with China.  If he were to delegate 
major decisions to his foreign policy advisors, Taiwan might benefit from working 
with several Republican strategists who share Taiwan’s outlook (Michael Green, for 
example).  Both candidates have disavowed the Trans-Pacific Partnership.  
Therefore, Taiwan may not be able to count on TPP to bond with the United States. 
 
29 Austin Ramsey, “Taiwan Navy Accidentally Fires Antiship Missile, Killing Fisherman,” The 
New York Times, July 1, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/world/asia/taiwan-
china-missile.html?_r=0.   
30 The RNC platform’s language on Taiwan is as follows: “We salute the people of Taiwan, 
with whom we share the values of democracy, human rights, a free market economy, and the 
rule of law. Our relations will continue to be based upon the provisions of the Taiwan 
Relations Act, and we affirm the Six Assurances given to Taiwan in 1982 by President 
Reagan. We oppose any unilateral steps by either side to alter the status quo in the Taiwan 
Straits on the principle that all issues regarding the island’s future must be resolved peacefully, 
through dialogue, and be agreeable to the people of Taiwan. If China were to violate those 
principles, the United States, in accord with the Taiwan Relations Act, will help Taiwan 
defend itself. We praise efforts by the new government in Taipei to continue constructive 
relations across the Taiwan Strait and call on China to reciprocate. As a loyal friend of 
America, Taiwan has merited our strong support, including free trade agreement status, the 
timely sale of defensive arms including technology to build diesel submarines, and full 
participation in the World Health Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, 
and other multilateral institutions.” See the RNC platform at https://www.platform.gop/.  
The DNC platform’s language on Taiwan is shorter: “We are committed to a “One China” 
policy and the Taiwan Relations Act and will continue to support a peaceful resolution of 
Cross-Strait issues that is consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people of 
Taiwan.”  See DNC platform at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/117717.pdf.    
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U.S.-Taiwan relations may not fully stabilize until the national security team 
of the new U.S. president is in place, which could be as late as April or May 2017.  In 
the meantime, steady hands are needed to manage and nurture this important 
relationship.   
 
